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Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century
Robert H. Abramst
Riparianism has been the universal water law of the East for
two centuries. The doctrine has served the region well largely
because the demand on the water resource has rarely exceeded
supply. However, the East is now facing both unprecedented
demand and changing climatic conditions that will cause chronic
water shortages. Riparianism lacks a reliable method of allocating
water uses in times of shortage. Therefore, a search for alternatives
to the venerable doctrine must begin. This Article is the final part
of a trilogy' that outlines the need for a radical departure from
riparianism. It proposes to replace riparianism with a hierarchical
permit-based water rights system that features transferable permits.
The new system will function both in times of ample water supply
and in times of water shortage.
I.

REJECTING

PRIOR

APPROPRIATION AND EXISTING EAsTERN

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

Before presenting the proposed permit system, the inappropriateness of two other water allocation methods as alternatives to
riparianism, prior appropriation and administrative permit systems,
must be briefly discussed to show that a better alternative is needed.
In the arid West, where water shortages are common, prior appropriation replaced riparianism and became the dominant water
law. Riparianism's rules of sharing in times of shortage did not

t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
The author wishes to thank the Richard Barber Foundation and the Wayne
State Law School for financial support of this research. The views expressed herein
are those of the author.
1. The first part of the trilogy briefly traced the history of riparianism to
demonstrate that past changes in Eastern water law are explained by an instrumentalist theory of law. The Article also presented factors leading to a decline in
Eastern water supplies in the next thirty to fifty years, including the impact of the
greenhouse effect. Abrams, Chartingthe Course of Riparianism:An Instrumentalist
Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. Rv. 1381 (1989) [hereinafter Instrumentalist
Theory]. The second Article discussed and dismissed existing permit systems as
adequate alternatives to riparianism. See Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Considering a Move Away from Orthodoxy,
9 VA. ENvTL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1990) [hereinafter Comprehensive Permit
Systems].
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offer a sufficiently secure right to water use. To overcome this
insecurity, Western water law developed a temporal appropriation
system ("first in time, first in right") that erected a quantifiable
set of annual usufructuary rights that were far more precise than
the rights granted under riparianism. Thus, one might suppose
that prior appropriation could successfully replace riparianism in
any region facing water shortfalls because its allocative system was
designed for water-short areas.
Beyond security of right, two additional aspects of prior appropriation are particularly attractive: (1) its doctrinal promise to
avoid waste and promote conservation; and (2) its ability to permit
marketing of the water rights that results in the transfer of water
from low value uses to high value uses. Both of these features
foster efficient use of the water, allowing maximum utilization .2
Under scrutiny, the expected failure of riparianism on these two
counts is not total, nor is the expected exemplary performance of
prior appropriation patent.' These findings challenge the supposition that prior appropriation is the cure for riparianism and sparks
the search for still better alternatives.
Waste avoidance and conservation are vital to water-short
regions, and the governing water law doctrines must reflect the
importance of these practices. Riparianism views a wasteful use as
unreasonable, and therefore enjoinable, if it harms another user.
More important, in the ad hoc nature of riparian decisionmaking,
the presence or absence of conservation efforts can be used to
determine whether an otherwise reasonable riparian use is being
undertaken in a reasonable fashion during a time of shortage.
Prior appropriation guards against waste as a facet of the beneficial
use inquiry. Only the amount of water put to a beneficial use is
protected; for example, in an irrigation application, water that is
applied in excess of the amount needed for the crop can be
allocated to another user. In virtually all prior appropriation states,
2. Under the instrumentalist theory developed earlier in the trilogy, see
Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at 1381-1400, riparianism achieved the same
maximization until shortages posed "hard cases" that could not be resolved under
its flexible contours. Id. at 1400-05. These cases are the predicate for seeking
alternatives to riparianism. Thus, the ability of other legal regimes to maximize
water utilization is of considerable importance in evaluating their desirability for
adoption by Eas:ern states.
3. For an extensive discussion suggesting that the allocation of shortage by
shutting off the most junior in time user is itself wasteful and inefficient, see
Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 481, 510-14; Gaffney, Economic
Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 131, 139-40 (1969).
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however, the waste doctrine is not strictly applied. One commentator noted that "[prior appropriation] actually encouraged the
development of inefficient techniques in areas where greed and
speculation were commonplace; the greater the appropriation, the
greater the water right claimed ....
Only in cases of extreme
wastefulness have courts required that irrigation
appropriations
4
conform to customary practices of the region."
The second claimed attraction of prior appropriation systems
as an improvement on riparianism is the transferability of the
water rights. Riparianism's penchant for trying to accommodate
competing users through sharing of the shortage offers little promise to a user in a water-short area that water use will continue
without diminution. The user cannot increase the certainty of
continued water by purchasing additional water rights because
none of the coriparians can exclude others from the use of the
water. Each riparian will sell the usufructuary right of withdrawal
for whatever price it will bring. Low value and high value water
users alike have correlative rights, and there is no guarantee that
in time of shortage the uses curtailed will be the low, rather than
the high, value uses. Riparianism thus impedes the creation of a
5
meaningful water market.
In contrast, prior appropriation offers the user an opportunity
to purchase a senior water right, thereby ensuring more secure
water receipt. This buying and selling of water rights leads to the
possibility of creating a functioning water market in which the
price of water not only measures the cost of its provision, but
also reflects its value as a productive scarce resource. Unfortunately, prior appropriation's record of fostering water transfers

4. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprintfor Change, 61 OR.
L. REv. 483, 486 (1982). Conformity to local custom is hardly a standard that
inspires extensive conservation efforts. See, e.g., Tulare Irr. Dist. v. LindsayStrathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935) (condoning transmission
loss of almost half of diverted water as consistent with custom).
5. Only in the setting of a public utility clothed with the right of eminent
domain can riparianism support a form of water marketing. In times of shortage,
the condemned water users will be without the right to insist that the water utility
share the shortage. The utilities can pass on the cost of the purchased security of
right as part of the price of the water delivered to their customers, but there is
little evidence that those water suppliers use their power to charge a price to spur
conservation. See Center for Great Lakes, Reassessing Water, 6 GREAT LAKEs REP.
July-Aug. 1989, at 1. By the same token, in times of water abundance, water
supply organizations are unlikely either to ration, refuse water to potential customers, or promote conservation, for fear of angering the public they serve and the
regulatory authority that oversees their operations.
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that move scarce water to more valuable uses merits only faint
praise. Appropriative water rights, despite creating a quantified set
of usufructuary priorities capable of supporting efficiency-enhanc-

ing transfers, are not readily marketable commodities that can be

transferred easily to their highest use. 6 The doctrine has always
permitted transfers, but the transfers are limited by the "no harm
on transfer" rule, which requires deference to the security of the
rights of downstream junior water users who depend on making

use of water that is withdrawn, but not consumed, by upstream
seniors. 7 The no harm rule limits transfers to those in which the
disparity in values of the water to the transferee and transferor is
sufficiently great to overcome what are almost always very high

transaction costs.
Beyond the false promises of efficient water use and marketing
of water rights, a final objection to importing prior appropriation
to the East is the doctrine's neglect of instream uses, a systemic

weakness that is of particular concern in the Eastern United States.
The doctrinal insistence that a usufructuary right could only be
perfected by a physical diversion of water from the watercourse,
and thereafter applying the diverted water to a beneficial use,
made it impossible to obtain rights to protect instream flows needed
to support recreation or fish and wildlife habitat.8 Within the last

two decades, this shortcoming of appropriation law has been
addressed by state governments with statutes that protect instream

flows. 9 These statutes mark a departure from appropriation toward

a managerial system that accommodates the broader spectrum of

interests in ways that are more nearly riparian in flavor. 10 Thus,

6. One economist observes that "markets do not work as efficient allocators
even in theory if certain resource characteristics are in evidence. Water is a fugitive,
reusable, stochastically supplied resource which has many of the characteristics of
a common property resource and a public good." D. GIBBONS, TEM EcoNoMIc
VALu E

oF WATER 3 (1986).
7. See generally Ellis, Water Transfer Problems: Law, in WATER RESEARCH

233 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1966).
8. Even when instream uses were admittedly beneficial, as with a resort that
relied on the attraction of a scenic waterfall, the instream uses failed in competition
with offstream uses that could satisfy the diversion requirement. See Empire Water
& Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
9. See generally J. SAx & R. ABRAms, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES
318-1.9, 328-29 (1986). The judicial reception of these laws into the body of prior
appropriation law is at times somewhat grudging. See, e.g., State Dep't of Parks
v. State Dep't of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974) (dissenting
opinions of McQuade, J. & McFadden, J.).
10. See generally Dunning, State EquitableApportionment of Western Water
Resources, 66 NEB. L. REv. 76 (1987).
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what is sensibly under consideration as an alternative to riparianism, although flying the banner of prior appropriation, is instead
a potpourri of appropriation and regulation. This raises the ques-

tion of whether it would be preferable to build a replacement for
riparianism on a regulatory platform that grows out of riparian,
rather than appropriation, traditions.
A more attractive path for improving riparianism is to overlay
some government regulation on the traditional pattern of unbridled
private decisionmaking and common-law judicial review that has

determined water use patterns in the Eastern United States. Two
riparian states, Iowa and Florida, have adopted far-reaching permit
systems;" sixteen other riparian jurisdictions have supplemented
their common law with some kind of regulatory system.12 Although
their standards for permit issuance are linguistically similar to the

common-law doctrine, 3 these systems typically require some form
of administrative issuance of permits for the allocation of surface

waters. The systems are thus a significant departure from ripari-

anism because the permit applications are reviewed prospectively
before the use is initiated. States can therefore avoid user conflicts

before they arise by refusing a permit, conditioning a permit grant,
or taking actions that reduce the overall demand for water. These
systems are more sensitive than prior appropriation because the
permitting agency is empowered to consider the impact of the4
permit on competing uses, including instream uses of the water,1
and can control the duration of the permit. 5 Permits, like other

11. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261 to 455B.280 (West Supp. 1989); Florida
Water Resources Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-299 (codified at FiA. STAT.
ANN. § 373 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). The second Article in the trilogy, see supra
note 1, reviews these two comprehensive permit systems and concludes that although
they offer advantages over riparianism as an allocative mechanism, vocal political
opposition and resistance to regulation have prevented their widespread adoption.
See Comprehensive Permit Systems, supra note 1, at n.51. Even when adopted,
their performance has been a subject of some doubt. Id.
12. Sherk, Eastern Water Law, 1 NAT. REsoURCEs & ENV'T, Winter 1986,
at 7, 9-10; See also Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor
Reform, 24 WM & MARY L. Rv. 547 (1983) (review and critique of all Eastern
permit systems).
13. Dellapenna, Owning Surface Water in the Eastern United States, in PRoc.
oF THE SIXTH ANN. I NST. E. Mm. L. FouND. 1-35 (1985); see also O'Connell,
Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of
Water, 47 IowA L. RPv. 549, 615 (1962).
14. See, e.g., FiA. STAT. ANN. § 373.223 (West 1988).
15. See, e.g., Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and
Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191, 256-62 (1977).
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methods that quantify uses, allow easy introduction of priceinduced conservation methods such as a withdrawal and/or consumption fee on a per unit basis. However, most states have been
16
slow to adopt such fees.
Three evident drawbacks of a standard permit system are its
rigidity, its tendency to overregulate, and its lack of articulated
policy objectives. Permits in the typical Eastern systems are user
specific and are not transferable separate from the land that is
benefitted by the use. The system is hyperactive-even users who
are not part of the allocation problem are forced to participate in
government regulation. Finally, the existing systems offer little
guidance to state agencies. Administrative decisions, like their
riparian common-law forebearers, continue to be made on an ad
hoc basis with little regard for integrated water system management. 17

The foregoing critique of prior appropriation systems and the
bulk of the cu.rrent permit systems has tried to show that in many
ways those systems do not effectively manage the water resource.
Neither pose so attractive an alternative to riparianism that adoption is imminent. If a better alternative can be fashioned, the time
to act is now, for "damages can be lessened if societies utilize a
strategy of proactive risk management rather than one of reactive
crisis management. ' 1 8 Ideally, integrated intergovernmental longrange water planning might well be the optimal initial proactive
step. Comprehensive planning, however, is both a lengthy and
expensive process that too often fails to yield the definitive guidance needed to support a coherent resource management system.
The need is for a mechanism that is less cumbersome to implement,
yet has the capacity to respond to escalating pressure on the water
resource. The instrumentalist theory of water law comes to the
fore by identifying the principal objective sought-giving legal
protection to The most important uses of the water. 19
16. Almost no examples are to be found. Kansas has recently imposed perunit "protection fees" of $.03/1000 gallons (almost $10.00/acre-foot) on selected
municipal, industial, and stock watering uses. See Kansas S.B. 398 (1989).
17. See Comprehensive Permit Systems, supra note 1.
18. Hrezo, Walker & Mullins, Water Allocation During Water Shortages, in
LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATWE SYSTEMS FOR WATER ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT:

OPTIONS FOR CHANGE VIII-1, VIII-6 (1983) [hereinafter Legal and Administrative

Systems]. Cf. Maloney & Ausness, A Modern Proposalfor State Regulation of
Consumptive Uses of Water, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 523 (1971) (arguments favoring
comprehensive regulation).
19. See Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at 1384-86.
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II.

HmRARCmcAL PREFERENCE BASED PERMS

Establishing a workable system is a deductive process that has
three steps. First, it identifies the most critical human uses of the
water; second, it determines how those uses are effected physically;
and finally, it considers what law will secure them. The mere
choice of this methodology dictates one aspect of a workable
system. Once different water uses are perceived as qualitatively
separable in importance, those qualitative differences should be
manifested by the legal regime's preferred treatment of those uses.
A direct means of reflecting those determinations is the creation
of a permit system that is based on hierarchical preferences.
A.

Preferences
A system of preferences does not a priorineed a permit system
as an operational platform. Preferences could be assigned and
disputes could be resolved as they arose, saving the considerable
expense and inconvenience of establishing an administrative body
to review and pass on the vast universe of water uses. As a general
matter, however, a permit system has substantial advantages over
ad hoe resolution of water shortage disputes. A permit system can
prospectively review contemplated water uses. This review can
avoid costly dislocations that occur when water supplies are unexpectedly withdrawn by limiting the aggregate set of water use
claims to a sustainable level. It also can avoid dislocations by
warning permittees that not only is their use subordinate to the
uses of others in time of shortage, but it is likely that their use
will be displaced. The artful use of permit conditions offers the
potential to maximize use of the water resource in a manner
reminiscent of riparianism's ad hoc adjustments of individual water
uses. Permit systems also can provide informational and managerial
opportunities by serving as a vehicle for the collection of accurate
data about water usage, or as a tollhouse for the imposition of
water use fees intended to spur conservation. Finally, depending
on the design of the system, the permits may be transferable,
creating an opportunity for higher valued uses to buy out lower
valued uses, either in a market transaction, or assisted by the
power of eminent domain.
Although the preference concept is yet to be widely embraced, it does exist in riparian states' water law, in permit
systems already in place in the region, 2 0 and in the

20. Iowa and Florida, the two earliest entrants in the permit field, initially
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West.2 ' Riparianism's reasonable use doctrine has always supported
a narrow preference in favor of domestic use, sometimes referred
to as "natural use," which permits a single riparian to exhaust
the entire flow to the detriment of coriparians. 22 Similarly, a few
modern regulatory systems have already turned in this direction.
In these systems, the operation of a somewhat broader set of
preferences was built into the governing statute, usually triggered
by an executive declaration of water shortage or emergency. 23
B.

ConcentratedPopulations and Instream Flows

The support of concentrated populations is the most critical
use of water in the Eastern United States. 24 In a hierarchical
preference system, that use can be protected legally by granting it
a preference over all other uses. The domestic needs of concentrated populations consume very little water, even though the
sewage needs of a large population can require significant levels
of water withdrawal. 25 In general, these characteristics indicate that

failed to come to grips with alocative preferences. See Hines, A Decade of
Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System (pts. 1 & 2), 7 NAT. REsoURcES
J. 499, 548 (1967), 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 23, 70-71 (1968); Earl & Ankersen, Slicing
the Water Supply Pie: Competing Applications Under Florida's Water Resources
Act, FIA. B.J., June 1987, at 87, 90; Comprehensive Permit Systems, supra note
1. Iowa has since adopted an elaborate preference system. See IowA CODE AN.
§ 455B.266(2) (West Supp. 1989).
21. Prior appropriation law has long recognized a limited "preference"
doctrine under which a preferred use, such as domestic or municipal use, could
condemn and pay to displace a lower priority user. See Trelease, Preferences to
the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 133, 133 (1955). At times, uses have
been made expressly subordinate, as in a Montana statute that declared the export
of water for use in a coal slurry pipeline to be nonbeneficial, and therefore a use
for which no appropriative right could be perfected. Compare MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 85-2-104 (repealed 1985) with § 85-2-10-2(2) (1989).
22. See, e.g., D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30 (1984).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. H ALTH LAW § 1125 (Consol. Supp. 1989): N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-4 (West 1982); Sherk, supra note 12, at 53.
24. See generally Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at 1433. The support
of dispersed populations is likewise critical, but it is a low volume use that is of
relatively little concern here. Typically, dispersed household use in the Eastern
United States relics on low volume groundwater withdrawals, or at times, small
surface water diversions. The most significant possibilities for user conflict in these
settings are from large volume pumping causing well interference, or from upstream
diversion of the surface watercourse. In either case, it is seldom difficult to assure
the adversely affected rural domestic user of a replacement water supply as a
condition of permitting the high volume use to continue.
25. Id.

1989]

REPLACING RIPARIANISM

the grant of the penultimate priority to this particularly high value
use will raise few obstacles to the continuation of other water uses
in the region.
The key elements in providing essential water service to concentrated populations are relatively narrow. "Effective operation
of a public sewage system . .. requires using large quantities of
water for waste treatment, while the public's drinking needs generally cannot be met responsibly without storing water for future
use. ' 26 Thus, beyond the naked grant of the highest preference to
water rights that support concentrated populations, a satisfactory
governing water law will include legally secure storage rights.2 7
A similar line of argument can be made in favor of recognizing
instream flow protections. The work of the Second National Water
Assessment (Second Assessment) proved that instream flows are a
vital economic resource because they maintain fish and wildlife
habitat, which in turn support important recreation and harvesting
economies. 2 8 Instream flows are nonconsumptive to an even greater
extent than the support of concentrated populations. Therefore,
they only infrequently stand as an impediment to other productive
uses of the water. 29 Perhaps most important, even major segments
of the regional economies not directly dependent on instream flows
have nevertheless located their plants and operations with reference
to the availability of water. The continuation of historic patterns
of water flows avoids disruption of long-standing general expectations about water availability.
The factors just listed suggest setting a high level preference
for instream flows. Instream flows, however, do not fit into a
permit system with the same facility as water rights to support
26. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 95, 157 (1985). Professor Butler does not explain fully the reference to storing
water for future use. In context, it appears to refer to the need of cities to have
adequate reservoir capacity to respond to short-term decreases in supply or peaks
in demand. It may, however, refer to reservation by municipal suppliers of sufficient
water to meet long-term increases in water demand associated with future population
growth. See id. at 165-66. Both issues are important. Adequate reservoir capacity
is treated as an imperative, requiring legal action, see infra text accompanying
notes 31-32, while the question of accommodating future growth is canvassed later
in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
28. See Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at 1407-08.
29. The cases of potential conflict are most often demands for upstream,
offstream consumptive use, such as irrigation. The number of these cases is likely
to increase, but irrigation is a low value use of water.
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concentrated populations. While the ultimate beneficiary class of
both uses is dispersed, the needs of concentrated populations are
well-served by a water utility that can act as a permit applicant
and as an advocate for the needs of the beneficiary class. Instream
flow rights, in contrast, have no natural focal point. A system
would have to rely on government water planning agencies responsible for water management, and perhaps interested citizens,
to seek permits favoring instream flows.
In addition to the lack of more traditional advocates for
instream flow rights, there is a limited array of well-adapted legal
means available for protecting this water use. The basic options
rely either on a user activated system, in which parties benefitted
by the flow can challenge parties depleting it, or on a prescriptive
system of administrative decisionmaking to establish minimum
streamflow levels, circumscribed more or less tightly by legislative
standards and judicial review. 30 The latter can be adapted for use
in a hierarchical permit system by requiring the permitting agency
to protect instream flows by recognizing them as a limiting condition on the grant of all permits.
The minimum flow assignments method, which does not rely
on the issuance of specific permits to protect instream flows,
requires perhaps greater planning and a better working grasp of
the streams' inputs and outputs, but does seem to be the proactive
device that will best serve the needs of the region. Likely conflicts
between flow and consumption will be identified in advance. On
that basis, the permitting agency can refuse or limit the grant of
permits to those water users whose activites threaten an undesirable
impact on instream flows.
In terms of instream flow level setting, how protection can be
coordinated with the preference system is the first order of business
in ensuring that instream flow protection does not compromise the
sewage and drinking water needs of concentrated populations.
Initially, the possibility of a conflict between instream flow protection and a right that supports a concentrated population is
slight. To the extent that both are largely nonconsumptive, the
instream protection will simply reinforce the right of the population
center to have water flow to it. Virtually all Eastern cities are
located on rivers or lakes having a flow or size substantial enough
to have made it a factor in the original founding of the community.

30. Market systems fail to account for the widespread benefits associated
with multiple concurrent in situ uses of the water and therefore are unsuitable.
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As a quantitative measure, in many parts of the Eastern United
States the volume of water needed to support sewage and drinking
water supply could be assured by adapting as minimum flow
requirements the instream flow approximations (IFAs) calculated
by the Second Assessment. Although those IFAs were calculated
primarily to protect fish and wildlife habitats, and not with human
uses in mind, granting instream flow protection on this broader
basis ensures that important environmental values will not be
overlooked .3a Using the reworked IFAs will avoid the burdens of
quantifying population center needs because the instream flow
needed to support fish and wildlife (and navigation where appropriate) will be well in excess of the sewage and drinking water
needs of even heavily populated areas. 32 If the flows calculated
under the IFA methodology fail to fully protect population center
needs, specific provisions can be made. These may involve restricting upstream consumption of lower preference activities when
appropriate, utilizing the groundwater sources, building and supplying reservoir and delivery systems, or fostering interbasin transfers.
The second order of business is security of storage for drinking
water supplies. The existing law in the Eastern United States, albeit
indirectly, protects the security of storage water in surface watercourses, including reservoirs. Municipal water suppliers are invariably clothed with the power of condemnation, under which they
can eliminate any legal claims of right that would compromise
their use of the water, 33 or the land that is inundated in storing
the water.
In contrast to surface water storage, the Eastern legal rules
governing storage of groundwater do not provide sufficient security. This is an important concern for a variety of reasons, including the increasingly central role groundwater plays as a source
of municipal water supply and the comparative characteristics of
surface and aquifer storage:
31. Professor Butler argues that these values should be protected to ensure
acceptance of a comprehensive water allocation system. Butler, Defining a Water
Ethic Through ComprehensiveReform: A Suggested Frameworkfor Analysis, 1986
U. ILL. L. REv. 439, 468-79 (1986).
32. The principal exception to instream flow protection serving as a de facto
sewage and drinking water supply arises in relation to coastal cities. For those
areas, the surface rivers and streams are influenced by the ocean's salt water,
necessitating more elaborate upstream reservoir and delivery systems.
33. See, e.g., Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700
(1942).
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[A] municipality seeking an appropriate local reservoir site
for the storage of imported water may find underground
storage considerably less costly because it avoids the need
for a major land acquisition for the reservoir site....
[E]vaporation losses from a surface reservoir increase the
amount of water that must be obtained for import in order
to provide the desired water for the end users. In turn,
these increased initial amounts of water require that the
project be built on a larger scale which inevitably renders
the project more expensive to build. Finally, surface runoff into the reservoir may threaten pollution problems due
to the leeching of materials and maintenance problems due
34
to siltation.
Unlike riparianism, which is the universal surface water law
throughout the Eastern United States, there is no single dominant
legal doctrine governing groundwater. The riparian states adhere
to the following three common law doctrines: the absolute ownership rule, the reasonable use rule, and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 858 version of the reasonable use rule. 5 Two of
these doctrines provide no security of deposit for water stored in
aquifers. The absolute ownership rule is an unabashed rule of
capture, giving the right to water to whomever pumps it, without
regard to the source of the water or the effects on others of
removing the water from the aquifer. The reasonable use rule
allows the withdrawal of water without liability for any use that
is a "reasonable use" on the overlying tract. The Restatement
provides limited security of deposit in that it adds "an attempt to
balance equities and hardships among competing users ' 3 6 by requiring that the reasonableness of the use on the overlying tract
be judged with reference to its adverse effects on other users of
the resource. It is arguable, but not certain, that the harm to a
municipal storage project caused by pumping the water deposited
in the aquifer by an overlying owner, other than the municipality,
for any less preferred purpose is unreasonable under Section 858.
The narrow solution to the security concerns of water providers is
to legally protect imported stored groundwater by codifying the

34. J. Shx & R. ABRAms, supra note 9, at 870.
35. See Getches, Controlling Groundwater Use and Quality: A Fragmented
System, 17 NAT. REsouRcES LAW. 623, 623 (1985) and cases cited therein.
36. D. GErcHEs, supra note 22, at 242.
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several common-law doctrines to recognize an importer's superior
37
interest in all water imported and stored.
C. Quantification of Preferred Uses

Beneath the veneer of simplicity of preferring population supporting uses and instream flows, loom far more challenging questions about the workings of a hierarchical preference system. How
much water should a user be granted? What provision, if any,
should be made presently for the water needs of future population
growth? How much security against competition and curtailment
of water use is carried by a permit grant? What other qualitative
distinctions can be made in building the hierarchy of uses that will
benefit from subsequent preferences? Are there other systemic
changes that should be made to insure that Eastern waters are
available for use in a way that facilitates the well-being of the
region? Analyzing the first two of these questions, in the "easy
case" of initial permit allocations of water 38 to support concentrated populations, helps frame answers to these vitally important
questions.
The calculation of how much water is necessary to accomplish
the purposes for which the preference was granted has a familiar
ring to the ears of Western water lawyers, for that exact inquiry

37. Subsidiary issues of importation and storage, such as the right of the
importer to recapture and reuse seepage waters attributable to the use of the
imported water, are not discussed in this Article. For an examination of these
issues, see, e.g., Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wash. 2d 109, 685 P.2d
1068 (1984) (importer should be granted control over seepage to internalize benefits
of importation). See infra text accompanying notes 73-81 for consideration of the
broader question of whether to bring all water sources under the instrumentally
derived body of water allocation rules.
38. Choosing the initial distribution of permits means that there are no other
preexisting permits to be considered and integrated into an overall accommodation
of users. To the extent that a new permit system restricts current water users when
it becomes operational, they are constitutionally entitled to receive compensation.
Riparians not making a present use of the water may not be entitled to compensation. See, e.g., In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914). In any event,
the claims of nonusers can be minimized by giving them a relatively short temporal
window in which to initiate a use that would be compensable if curtailed. See,
e.g., In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Guadalupe River Basin, 642
S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982). A fund for the payment of constitutionally required
compensation can be raised through water use charges. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-3-3(2)(b) (1953 & Michie Supp. 1989); Aikins v. Arizona Dep't of Water
Resources, 154 Ariz. 437, 743 P.2d 946 (1987); see also infra text accompanying
notes 58-59.
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is made in quantifying reserved water rights. Reserved water rights
exist in federal law and spring into existence outside the bounds
of the state law prior appropriation doctrine. Reserved rights arise
when the United States withdraws land from the public domain
and reserves it for a specific federal purpose, such as an Indian
reservation or a national park. Water that has not yet been
appropriated under the state law doctrine is impliedly reserved to
effect the purposes for which the federal government is reserving
the land. A seminal United States Supreme Court decision enunciated the controlling rule that only the water "necessary to fulfill
the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created"
and not water that "is only valuable for a secondary use" 3 9 is the
amount available for use on the reserved lands. Although federalism concerns militated in favor of a narrow reservation, the
Court also recognized water scarcity in crafting this narrow approach to determining the intent of Congress in reserving water
that would be allocated outside the usual prior appropriation
system: "If water were abundant, Congress' silence would pose
no problem. In the arid parts of the West, however, claims to
water for use on federal reservations inescapably vie with other
public and private claims for the limited quantities to be found in
4

the rivers and streams.'

0

The identical premises of scarcity and competition animate the
move away from the reign of traditional riparianism. Those factors
that weighed in favor of guarding the quantity of water reserved
in the Western context should do the same in the East, which now
faces conditions of scarcity and competition. In the Eastern permit
system proposed as a replacement for riparianism, the amount of
water for which a preference is granted should be constrained by
an awareness of increasing demands and dwindling supply. Quantifying the domestic and sewage water needs of cities to support
population requires minimizing the amount of water covered by
this most favored preference. Although the minimization requirement seems harsh, it must be remembered that cities can obtain
additional water supplies to support other activities, but without
41
the benefit of the highest preference.
39. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
40. Id. at 699.
41. Much additional water obtained by municipal suppliers that exceeds what
is necessary for population support almost certainly would be classed with water
for industrial and manufacturing use, proposed later as the next most privileged
classification. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53. Water for less favored
purposes carried on in cities (e.g., lawn watering) would have to compete with
other disfavored uses to obtain supplies.
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Municipal needs are, in comparison to the flow of the region's
major river systems, small volume needs that can be quantified
easily. Sewage and drinking water uses are well-defined and understood uses that do not vary much from locality to locality, or
over time. The limits of use are knowable, as are the potential
reductions in use that can be made through water pricing strategies,
installation of conservation hardware, and recycling of effluent
water. The goal in quantification is not to understate the need,
but to guard against extravagant claims in a water-scarce area.
Therefore, the amount of water allowable in this preference class
should reflect reasonable conservation and recycling efforts. If
reuse of effluent water in the sewage system is feasible, it should
be required. 42 Likewise, there should be no absolute protection of
either the point or method of diversion. If aquifer storage is
feasible and less consumptive than reservoir storage, the first
priority right should be drawn with the more water efficient
practice as its basis.
As a matter of policy, predicted population growth is the most
difficult variable to account for in quantifying the population
supportive preference. The uncertainties inherent in water demand
forecasting 43 give rise to a credible fear that too much water will
be claimed to support future growth, inhibiting present lower
preference users from beginning or expanding water dependent
activities. As a counterpoint, water suppliers should be encouraged
to plan for their future needs by being granted permits that take
into account the suppliers' good faith efforts to anticipate the
water demands of their service area. 44 Permits issued on this basis
may grant a preference for a significant quantity of water for
which there is no present use. This must be done because the needs
of the water utility are not served adequately by granting a series
of ever-increasing permits as incremental population growth occurs.
While approximations of the actual need for water may be very

42. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist.
(EBMUD), 52 Cal. App. 3d 828, 125 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1975) (EBMUD's right to
appropriate denied because recycling water could supply all water EBMUD could
apply to beneficial use for which additional appropriation sought), aff'd, 20 Cal.
3d 327, 142 Cal. Rptr. 904, 572 P.2d 1128 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 26 Cal.
3d 183, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 605 P.2d 1 (1980).
43. For a sketch of the science of water demand forecasting, see Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at text accompanying notes 205-20.
44. See, e. g., Saleba, Water Demand Forecasting, in PRoc. oF Tm ANN.
CoNF. op Tm AM. WATER WoRKs A. SEMnARi
RISK ASSESSMENT 21, 21-22 (1985).
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nearly a linear function in which water needs increase as a function
of population, the realities of building water supply and delivery
systems are nonlinear. A water utility does not bring new water
sources on line incrementally with each new person requiring
service. Rather, it achieves economies of scale by adding capacity
to its system in relatively large pieces.
The inhibiting effect of granting permits to meet future needs
on present development depends in part on the rights of a permit
holder to transfer the permit. Nontransferable permits inhibit
present use only modestly, because water that a supplier falls to
withdraw and use is physically available for use by other developers. Transferable water permits allow potential present users to
purchase excess water from the present right holder. This fosters
immediate use of the water without detriment to the policy reasons
45
that auger in favor of the present grant premised on future needs.
There may be some inhibiting effects on low valued immediate
uses that sterm from a grant to preferred users of rights in excess
of present use. 46 These are not so much an evil as they are a
reflection of 1,he smooth operation of regional planning. Inhibiting
the movement of presently unused water into a less preferred use
that would be displaced when the projected growth matures into
an actual use avoids dislocations surrounding the termination of
the displaced use. To argue that the future displacement is speculative and that present development is therefore more important
forgets that the premise for mounting the new system is that
shortages requiring water allocation among competing users will
materialize.

45. If, in this hypothetical, permits are transferrable as to the quantum of
water involved and as to their preference (i.e., the transferor's use, not the
transferee's use, determines the level of preference accorded to the right in the
hands of the transferee), then the purchaser of the present right will have an
unusually secure right that will be defeasible on whatever terms are agreed to in
consummating the transfer. This prompts present use of the water in the hands of
a transferee.
46. If the water supplier is unwilling to transfer the current right to the
unused water, the existence of the permit deters initiation of present uses that,
would be curtailed if the full amount of water granted by the permit was put to
use by the supplier. Rational permit holders with rights in excess of immediate
needs should be expected to transfer the excess on terms that fully protect their
interest. If the quantum is transferable but the preference is not transferable, the
transfer of the currently unused portion of the permit has the same impact on
present and potential users as the grant of a permit at the preference level associated
with the use being made by the transferee. See infra text accompanying note 58.
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In granting a present permit that covers future use of water,
the permitting agency still needs to strike a balance between present
and future users. The most obvious standard to guide agency
action is a requirement that the water covered by the permit be
necessary to effect a use to which the preference applies. This will
force consideration of the amount of water awarded by the permit,
including a reduction of the amount needed by use of conservation
or other strategies. The second standard for agency action is
consistency with any independent long-term regional planning and/
or water planning being conducted. -In the simplified case of initial
rights distribution to the highest preference users, a logical third
question, that of water availability, is largely moot. There is no
need to consider what impact the grant of additional permit rights
will have on existing permittees precisely because there are as yet
no other permittees. 47 As sketched out previously, there is little
possible conflict between these first priority permits and instream
flow protection because the flow protection often assists in satisfying the first priority uses. 48 In other contexts, water availability,
or the amount of permit rights granted in relation to the anticipated
49
total level of supply, will be a far more important question.
Exaggerated claims can be deflated by the established procedure
of allowing preissuance challenges by interested parties, and then
subjecting the agency decision to judicial review on the basis of
the record compiled before the agency. 0
D. Additional Preferences and Security of Right
Moving from the example of how the permit process might
work in an easy case toward the complexities entailed in a large
permit system populated by several classes of water users, the two
most significant remaining issues are those of additional preference

47. The only possible conflict over water availability that could arise in this
setting is between two first preference users for allocation of an inadequate source.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32. In the event of conflict, the
drinking water needs of the population would, either by virtue of holding the
highest priority or by being even more important than instream flow protection,
prevail, and the flow would not be protected.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 58-59.
50. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). The
standard of review may be important. Something more searching than allowing the
agency decision to stand so long as it is not an abuse of discretion should be
employed. One possible standard is insistence that the agency decision be supported
by "substantial evidence contained in the record." See, e.g., Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
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classifications and security of right. Precise resolution of the
question of additional preference classifications should reflect the
perceived needs of the enacting ripariart state, but some speculation
is possible.
In theory, there is no limit to the number of different preference levels that could be established. In practice, it would seem
that introducing more than four or five classifications would
introduce qualitative distinctions where none exist. After differentiating water use into human and ecosystem life cycle support
(drinking water, sewage, and instream flow protections), high value
economic uses (commercial and industrial), middle value economic
uses (possibly mining and/or energy production), and low value
economic uses (agricultural), it is hard to see what other distinctions
are necessary. As a general proposition, the key consideration in
granting a high or low preference is the answer to the following
question: in time of shortage, would a disinterested Platonic guardian discontinue use A before or after use B? The precise placement
of uses into categories reflecting their relative importance within
a state ought to reflect local economics. Data from various regions
within the Eastern United States attests to striking differences in
water usage."' To the extent that there is uncertainty about how
to classify a particular use, the instrumentalist theory would tend
to call for according greater legal protection to high value uses of
water.5 2 For example, agricultural use is a notoriously low value
water use. Thus, even in a state where agriculture is an important
industry, this low value would place agriculture in a position
subordinate to industrial uses at least to the extent that the
industrial uses are carried on in a water conserving fashion.5 3
Security of right in a preference-based permit system encompasses four general issues.5 4 At a minimum, a permitted water
right must allow a rights holder within a preference class to receive
water ahead of rights holders in less preferred classes if supplies
are inadequate to satisfy all permit holders. Second, to provide
sufficient security of right, a legal system must specify the rights
51. See Instrumentalist Theory, supra note 1, at text accompanying notes
184-97.
52. See generally D. GiBBONS, supra note 6.
53. Politics tend to distort this process. In Iowa, when preferences were
legislated, livestock use came ahead of power production and industrial use. See
IOWA CODE Ami. § 455B.266(2) (West Supp. 1989).
54. Cf. Putt, Allocation of Supplies Among Competing Offstream Users, in
LEGAL AND ADminsTRATivE SYsteMs, supra note 18, at 11-29 (delineating qualities
of administrative regime that allocate water to changing class of users).
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of permittees within a preference class inter sese in the event that
uses among them must be curtailed. A third subsidiary issue, but
one of the utmost practical importance, is the basis on which to
issue additional rights in a higher class, or in the same class,
subsequent to the initial distribution of permits. Finally, security
of right implicates the issues of the duration, renewability, and
revocability of permits.
The first form of security of right is the most straightforward
when viewed from the position of the superior rights holder. That
permit holder knows that in times of shortage, the superior use
will be continued ahead of a lower preference use. For example,
in a four-tier preference system like the one suggested above, 5 in
times of shortage an industrial user knows that irrigators would
be forced to discontinue their use if it would prevent the industrialist from receiving the permitted quantity of water. Similarly,
the industrialist's use is always at risk relative to the preferred
municipal use during shortage periods. If desired, the administrative system can be manipulated to cushion the financial hardship
to less preferred users not receiving water during these periods.
Dislocation compensation from reserve funds, built up through
the collection of water withdrawal and water consumption charges,
could mitigate these effects. The adverse financial impact of discontinued use would thus be minimized, and if the permit system
does not grant permit rights far in excess of the water that is likely
6
to be available, the total compensation cost will be reasonable.1
The second aspect of security of right involves the rights of
permit holders within a single classification relative to each other
in times of shortage. The potential resolutions of this problem fall
into the following two general categories: (1) prospectively assigning which users in the class will bear the burden of a shortage; or
(2) leaving that difficult problem to a postshortage determination.
There are several prospective options, including pro rata reductions, use of an intraclass priority system, perhaps borrowing
priority in time from prior appropriation doctrine, or using subclasses to determine who must relinquish their permit rights first.
Another option is to take advantage of the fact that permits are
issued prospectively and can be granted subject to specifications
that determine the order of shutoff in the event of shortage. In
any event, these prospective devices all make it clear to the permit
55. The system has four tiers if instream flows calculated by an IFA-like
process are treated as other than a preference category.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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holders that their permits are subject to administrative suspension,
according to
announced rules in the event of a water shortage
57
emergency.
A second method for allocating the shortfall might be to have
users of water within a class bid for the right to continue to
receive water. Those willing to pay a greater premium would
continue to receive water, and the premiums collected could help
to fund compensation for those who are outbid. The bidding
system could operate prospectively by holding an annual bid even
before the extent of possible shortages is known. This would have
a revenue advantage because many users for whom security of
supply is particularly important presumably would pay the premium even in years when shortages do not materialize, thus
creating surplus funds that can compensate suspended users in
future shortage years. This bidding system, especially if coupled
with a markel for the transfer of water rights, has the additional
advantage of tending to push the price of water upward, spurring
conservation measures.
None of the various possible intraclass shortage allocation rules
is inherently superior. Attempting to avoid intraclass shortages by
severely restricting the amount of water granted to each user under
the permit system is the only device that should be summarily
rejected, if the grants are so niggardly as to prevent even a
reasonable le-vel of water utilization. Prospective allocation rules
have as a general advantage the ability to offer greater certainty
than do after the fact allocations. Still, if after the fact systems
rely on market mechanisms, these systems seem likely to promote
continuance of the highest value uses. Systems relying on administrative discretion leave the greatest opportunity to accommodate
competing uses to minimize the number of users forced to shut
down, thus minimizing dislocation costs. A further possibility
would be to adopt one of the prospective rules and simultaneously
grant the administrative agency a power to add conditions in times
of shortage. For example, the timing of industrial withdrawals

57. The question remains as to what basis the agency will use to determine
who continues to receive water and who is shut off. If the statute contains no
standards, the matter will be highly political. Presuming that permit rights are
transferable, those who are denied water might seek to pay other continuing users
within the class to forego their water. This will continue the more valuable uses,
but it may create an unintended windfall for users who were lucky enough to
avoid curtailment, even though the water was less valuable to them than to their
vendee.
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might be orchestrated by administrative orders that protect instream flows at their minimum levels, or irrigators having cropping
choices might be allotted only enough water to support the crop
demanding the least water. If the administratively spurred savings
are not sufficient, then the selected prospective shortage allocation
rule would take over.
The third general security of right issue relates to how new
uses are phased into the system. Each new permit increases the
set of water entitlements in existence, thereby changing the security
of all permittees. For example, if a new municipal drinking water
supply permit is issued for a particular source of supply, all lower
class users of the supply have been subordinated to the new higher
preference user. All class one users have been threatened with
increased intraclass competition that may, depending on the intraclass shortage rules, deprive them of water.
As a managerial matter, water allocation systems should be
wary of granting new permits that undercut older permits. Prior
appropriation, in which older rights, by virtue of temporal priority,
are always superior to newer rights, is the penultimate example of
avoiding displacement of prior rights. 8 As the hypothetical grant
of a new water right in a preferred category illustrates, a preference
system that continues to issue permits after the initial distribution
of rights cannot match the purity of prior appropriation in protecting current users against competition from new entrants. A
preference system can limit the occasions on which the new permittees displace the old by "underpermitting," that is, by granting
permit rights to less water than is likely to be used, but this defeats
the vital purpose of having the permit system manage the allocation
of water in time of average or abundant supply as well as in time
of shortage.
Designing an operational preference system that grants new
security-impairing permits requires a sensitivity to the equity claims
of existing permittees. The equity claim of an existing permittee is
supported by the justifiable expectation that investment in a waterdependent beneficial use will not be lost through the grant of
additional permits to newer entrants before a reasonable period in
which to recoup that investment has run. This equity claim is
different and stronger than a claim to be free of a shortageinduced curtailment of water rights. Here, the basis of the com58. Even so, prior appropriation doctrine limits the creation of new junior
rights by the requirement that there be unappropriated water available to the newest
claimant.
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plaint is the permitting agency's deliberate act of adding to the
pool of superior or equal claims to the resource. In the simple
shortage setting, nature and the inexorable fact that the shortage
must be allocated temper any perceived unfairness. The permittee
has foreknowledge that the right to receive water was not absolute
in the event of inadequate supply.
The addition of a temporal dimension to the scope of permitted
rights can protect a permittees' justifiable expectations to a reasonable period of enjoyment unhindered by greatly increased competition from new permit holders. For example, in a mature permit
system 59 the agency can decide against granting new permits that
would impair the security of existing permits during their first five
years (or other statutorily designated period) of operation. This
policy could take effect by establishing the following two rules:
first, an intraclass allocation rule that protects the newest permittees from cur'ailment; and second, an interclass rule that requires
full compensation by the agency in the event that satisfaction of
newly granted rights in a higher preference class forces curtailment
of an older right in a lower class within the statutory protection
period. This favoritism for new entrants might prove politically
unworkable because the established water user base will likely have
far more political strength than the group of new users.
A more realistic system politically, and one that stresses planning for future growth, could be based on a requirement that the
permitting agency not increase the total amount of rights in any
preference category by more than a specified percentage in a
relatively long period, perhaps ten or fifteen years. The needs of
development, which require that some water rights be available at
any given time, could be met by the allowable growth built into
the planning process. Should even more water be demanded, new
0
entrants could always purchase or retire existing uses.

59. The term "mature" describes a permit system that has been in operation
for a long enough period for the initial set of permits to have been issued. In
granting the initiad set of permits, the agency may lack sufficient data to be certain
of the total magnitude of the use allowed by permits issued to the initial applicants.
Therefore, the agency cannot reliably limit the quantum of rights superior to those
granted to any single permittee. Likewise, in an initial distribution, equity claims
based on priority of use are far weaker or perhaps nonexistent.
60. This is much like the requirement that air pollution offsets be obtained
by emitters seeking to locate in areas where the present set of emissions equal or
exceed the total allowed under national ambient air quality standards. See Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1982).
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The final aspect of security of right is the lifespan of permits.
Permits of unlimited duration deny the agency important leverage
with which to influence the behavior of permit holders, particularly
in regard to inducing permit holders to make a more efficient use
of water through increased conservation or recycling. A permit
holder facing the prospect of a renewal hearing before a permitting
agency will respect that agency's suggestions about improved efficiency of use. This is especially true if renewal of the permit is
conditioned on a permittee's past record of conservation and
recycling.
Renewal authority complements the other management powers
of the agency. One important facet of this type of power is the
ability of the agency to increase the overall security of right
provided by the system. If the agency can obtain improved conservation and recycling efforts from existing permit holders, the
system can achieve water-dependent growth without a proportionate increase in actual water use. In this way, new entrants pose
less of a threat to existing users' security of right. The new water
users will obtain water by de facto transfer from the conserving
permittees. If it is desirable to free the "transferor" of all or part
of the cost of conservation, the "transferee" (new entrant) could
be required to pay compensation to help defray the expense. In a
system not allowing transfers, the permittee could relinquish the
conserved part of the right to the agency that can then allocate it
to a new permittee. 61 In a related manner, the potentially devastating effects of denying water to permit holders in times of
shortage can be made less widespread if the agency can threaten
renewal difficulties to "persuade" some large volume users to
voluntarily forego a portion of their entitlement in crisis situations.
Beyond being of limited duration, permits should be revocable
under a very limited set of circumstances. Water shortage would
not be such a circumstance because the permits already represent
only a qualified right to receive water in times of shortage. Also,
as long as permits are of limited duration, there is no need to
revoke or alter permits in the event of either nonuse or a change
in use.62 The impetus to revoke in the nonuse situation is abhorrence of waste or nonuse. In this setting nonuse is not wastesome less preferred water user will get to use the water. The limited

61. If substantial withdrawal or consumption fees are charged, rights holders
will have an incentive to reduce actual water use.
62. Change of use is analytically similar to transfer of rights in this system.
See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:93

duration of permits insures that wasteful uses will not be allowed
to continue. An ill-used permit will not be renewed on the same
basis. So too, the intraclass shortage allocation rules can require
the agency to deny water to wasteful permit holders-a sanction,
short of revocation, sufficient to protect the public interest. Thus,
rather than allocational and efficiency concerns, the grounds for
revocation and alteration of permits ought to be very straightforward, such as nonpayment of withdrawal and consumption fees,
failure to make required reports, or fraud in the application for,
or taking of, water.
E.

Transfer of Water Rights

In detailing the operation of a hierarchical preference system,
it is apparent that transfers of water rights represented by permits
play a role. Up to this point, the possibility, and in some places
the desirability, of transferability has been tacitly assumed, but
relatively little has been said about the impact of transfers on the
water rights they represent or on the water rights of other permittees. The example of a change in use to a less preferred use
poses issues about transferability that are more challenging than
the issues surrounding nonrenewal or revocability for failing to
use the allotted water as originally permitted.
After water is dedicated to a less preferred use, either by
transfer or by a change in the operations of the original permittee,
the question of the preference level of the permit for the less
preferred use arises. Either the permit will maintain its old preference, or it will be downgraded to match the new use. The
downgrading of the permit puts the water rights in parity with the
water rights of others making the same use, subject to intraclass
allocation rules at the lower-and more likely to be curtailedpreference level. This avoids drawing distinctions of right among
water users within a particular class, but it is not clear that the
absence of distinctions created by the users, rather than by the
permitting agency, is desirable. Efficiency reasons not to downgrade the preference classification of the permit may exist. For
example, if a marginally profitable industrial user were to transfer
a water right to an agricultural user, that agricultural user, by
outbidding other potential purchasers of the right without regard
to their intended use, has demonstrated that the right is more
valuable in that agricultural use than it is in the other uses. If the
preference is not downgraded, the agricultural user has purchased
the security to remain in operation without fear of curtailment of
water supplies in the event that the agricultural preference class,
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but not the industrial preference class, is curtailed due to shortage.
More generally, as seen in the discussion of the difficulty of
creating truly marketable water rights in a prior appropriation
system, 13 transfers threaten to affect the rights of other permit
holders to the extent that the changed use is more consumptive or
involves different points of diversion or return flow. The prior
appropriation system, in providing security based on seniority, is
obliged to enforce a "requirement of noninjury [to] protect the
vested rights of junior appropriators to the continuation of stream64
conditions existing at the time of their respective appropriations.''
Transfers under a hierarchical preference system will not be strangled by an equivalent restriction. In a permit system that does not
make even the lesser pledge to hold existing water rights inviolable
against subsequently initiated uses (e. g., new permits of equal or
higher preference), there is no logically compelling reason to require
that changes in existing uses (e. g., transfers of existing permits)
satisfy a no harm rule.
To conclude that a no harm on transfer rule is not a necessary
part of the hierarchical system does not mean that an inquiry into
harm on transfer is not appropriate. The managerial interest of
having a system that provides maximum security in conjunction
with the desired flexibility allowed by new and changed uses
suggests that permit transfers ought to be subject to control by
the permitting agency. The agency can protect against unacceptably
severe ,third party effects by limiting the amount of water transferred, placing operational conditions on the transfer, or by disapproving the transfer altogether. However, the enforcement
standard is not the restrictive no harm rule of prior appropriation
law. Instead, the standard is a much more open-ended one in
which third party effects are but one part of the inquiry.
III.

TRANSITIONAL STRATEGIES

To complete the sketch of how a hierarchical preference permit
system would replace riparianism, several central matters related
to introducing and designing an effective permit system remain for
discussion. 6 Foremost among these are sensitive political issues

63. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
64. In re May, 756 P.2d 362, 371 (Colo. 1988) (citations omitted).
65. For a sketch of a much more limited type of permit system that anticipates

shortages being only intermittent and not widespread, see D. GRUBBS & H. COHEN,
LEGISLATIVE FRAiwoRK FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEmENT IN ALABAu

(1973).
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that will affect the willingness of a state to adopt a system before
riparianism's ill-suited legal doctrines turn a serious water shortage
into a major economic crisis. Of greatest concern are matters of
phasing in the new system, limiting as much as possible the new
regulatory burdens it places on the water-using community, and
framing a policy on explosive issues such as the extent to which
interbasin transfers of water will be allowed or promoted by the
new system, and the protections, if any, provided to the originating
region. Another important operational issue is the unification of
surface water and groundwater into a single management system.
A.

Avoiding Taking and Overregulation

The switch from riparianism to comprehensive regulation need
not be painful. The following constitutionally safe formula has
been proposed: existing water users must be allowed to continue
their uses without material change for a reasonable period of time,
and nonuser riparians can be given some opportunity to initiate
66
uses that would put them on a par with the present water users.
Operationally, this means that all current users must be able to
trade their present unregulated riparian right of use for a permit
of limited duration that does not materially diminish the quantity
of water allocated to the user. 67 If the changeover is attempted
before absolute water shortages have become severe, there will be
relatively few cases in which a current user, by virtue of receiving
a permit that carries a low preference level, will be denied water
by operation of the permit system. For current users who receive
permits but no water because their use is curtailed by the operation
of the preference system, compensation is not required, but may
68
nonetheless be appropriate.
The latter implementing strategy, which allows riparians a
prospective opportunity to initiate uses, may not be necessary for

66. See supra note 37 and text accompanying notes 58-59.
67. Initial changeover permits could require that some conservation be undertaken without being deemed to materially diminish the existing "water right."
The conservation demands would be most valuable to the state in achieving maximal
use of the water and most appropriate-not to mention least vulnerable to a
takings claim-in water basins where some absolute shortage problems already
exist.
68. Compensation is not required because on an overburdened stream, no

riparian owner is assured of receiving water. All are subject to being shut off if
their use is unreasonable. In this instance, through the policy judgments implicit
in the preference system, the curtailed use is found to be unreasonable upon
shortage.
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a statute to survive constitutional attack as a taking of property,
but its inclusion is advisable on two grounds. First, it wholly
vitiates the possibility that the destruction of unexercised riparian
rights could be held to be a taking. Second, it eliminates the aura
of unfairness that attends the sudden elimination of the formerly
unfettered right of a riparian proprietor to initiate a water use.
This window of opportunity puts holders of unexercised riparian
rights on par with the well-protected existing user class-both can
obtain initial water use permits free of the "water availability"
scrutiny that would be given to a new applicant in a mature permit
69
system.
Another valuable implementing strategy is limiting the scope
of coverage of the permit system. This strategy provides a dual
benefit if small volume users are granted an exemption from the
permit system and the geographical operation of the permit system
is restricted to those basins having present shortages, or shortages
that are foreseeable within a few years. Exempted small volume
users will not view the permit system as another unnecessary form
of government harassment because they are free from the expense
and travail of being dragged into the bowels of a complex regulatory system. 70 At the same time, limiting the number of permits
to be processed guards against waste of what are certain to be
scarce agency personnel resources. Identical benefits are gained by
exempting even large volume users in nonstressed watersheds, again
without compromising the effectiveness of the permit system,
because the predicate for imposing the system, chronic shortage,
is not present. The dual nature of the regulation-stringent in
water-short areas and relaxed in water-sufficient areas-parallels
the most sophisticated systems of Western groundwater management. 71 It is already a dichotomy used in some Eastern permit
72
systems.
B. Interbasin Transfers
Among the most acrimonious issues in water planning are
interbasin transfers of water. A long history of extensively litigated
69. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
70. The water uses of small volume users should be reported to complete
the water use data base, but this can be accomplished by a simple informational
submission that recites the point of diversion, the usual dates of diversion, the
amount of water diverted, and the use of the water.
71. Several Western groundwater protection schemes have implemented an
"active management area" concept. See, e.g., Amiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-411
to -637 (1987); NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 46-656 to -674.20 (1986).
72. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13 (1988).
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disputes between water importers and representatives of the basin
of origin can be found in the water law of both the East and the
West. 73 To clothe the administrative permitting agency with the
power to approve interbasin transfer proposals entails political
risks for the initial acceptance of the system, and for the agency
in operating the system. Interbasin transfers need not be a mostfavored option in addressing subregional undersupply, but in spite
of the political risks the power must be granted to the agency.
Otherwise, the new permit system will fail to serve the instrumentalist imperative of allocating water in a way that supports important economic and development needs.
Certain devices, including area of origin compensation, 74 can
temper the political backlash that permitting interbasin transfers
may engender, limiting the damage to the permit system's operation. First, to deflect the political strain on the agency, legislative
ratification of transfers over a threshold volume of water could
be required. Second, as just suggested, interbasin transfers can be
disfavored in comparison to options such as requiring vigorous
conservation. Operationally, the agency could apply a presumption
that large volume interbasin transfers will be used only after a
finding of necessity for the water in the importing region. A more
interesting addition is for the agency to also require a finding of
"relative availability" of water in the area of origin. To promote
acceptance of the regulatory system, the agency could offer a
presumption of "lack of availability" to regions that elect, by
local vote or other process, to be subject to the full operation of
the permit system. Thereafter, any importer would have the burden
of rebutting the presumption that there is no water available for
interbasin transfer.

73. The fight over the out-of-basin diversion of Great Lakes water resurfaced
in the summer of 1988, prompting a maelstrom of debate between the Great Lakes

congressional delegation (except for the Illinois contingent, which favored export)
and the delegation representing downstream Mississippi River states. The diversion

at Chicago has always been controversial. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S.
426 (1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). The controversy surrounding out-of-basin
transfers continues; the United States Supreme Court recently ruled on a small
part of the battle over the westward diversion of Missouri River water waged
between South Dakota and its downstream coriparians. See ETSI Pipeline Project
v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 (1988).
74. See generally L. MAcDoNmNLL, C. HowE, J. CoRBRmGE & W. ABuaqs,
GUIDtRMS FOR DEVELOP1NG AEA-OF-OIGiN COMPESATION (1985).
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Watershed Management and Conjunctive Use

The permit system need apply only to regions of the state
where shortage conditions exist. In those areas where the system
does operate, the scope of operation should be on a watershedby-watershed basis, controlling all of the users dependent on the
same water source. The permit system would be frustrated, for
example, by allowing an unregulated upstream irrigator in an
unregulated area to consume water needed to satisfy the permit
rights of a downstream municipal or industrial permittee.
A variant on that same simple example demonstrates the need
for managing the "conjunctive use ' 75 of all hydrologically connected water, including both groundwater and surface water. Assume that the stream in question is an effluent stream that draws
the bulk of its summer baseflow from a groundwater aquifer.
Assume further that the upstream irrigator takes water through a
high capacity well rather than by diversion of surface flows. If
the resultant pumping depletes streamflow in the same manner as
did the surface diversion, there can be no conclusion other than
to treat the necessity of its regulation as indistinguishable from
the necessity of regulating upstream surface withdrawals.
Historically, the gulf between theoretically recognizing the need
to regulate hydrologically interrelated ground and surface water,
and practically doing it, has been rather wide. Groundwater-surface
water conflicts have been litigated for at least ninety years,7 6 but
only slightly more than a dozen states have reformed their water
law to integrate the management of the unified resource, and the
overwhelming majority of those are Western states that employ
prior appropriation to govern both types of water.7 7 Happily,
78
despite the lack of extensive legal experience with conjunctive use,
to integrate the management of groundwater and surface water

75. See, e.g., Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water,
27B RocKY MTN.MN. L. INST. 1853 Ann. Proc. 1981.
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899); see also
Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189 (1972).
77. See Grant, The Complexities of Managing Hydrologically Connected
Surface Water and Groundwater Under the PriorAppropriationDoctrine, 22 LAND
& WATER L. Rnv. 63, 64-65 (1987); see also Sherk, supra note 12, at 56 (as of
1986 only New Hampshire had conjunctive use law). Grant notes that all 13
Western states employing appropriation for both types of water have the means to
achieve integrated management, but that practical difficulties exist.
78. Professor Grant notes that "[d]espite this legal foundation, experience
with integrated management under the appropriation doctrine is limited." Grant,
supra note 77, at 65.
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under the proposed permit system is no harder than to require all
water users within a regulated hydrologic basin, regardless of point
or method of diversion, to obtain a permit. 79 The harder part of

making the conjunctive use a reality under the permit system will
be amassing data that can lead to a reliable understanding of how
the interrelationship of the water will manifest itself under various
withdrawal scenarios.
The legal impact of the permit requirement for groundwater
users is more or less significant depending on the previous governing groundwater law in the jurisdiction. In an absolute ownership
jurisdiction," being subject to regulation circumscribes the previous
unlimited right to withdraw water. The regulation, because it
provides enhanced security of right to users of a common pool
resource, is assuredly a reasonable regulation of those having
property rights in the resource, and not a taking." Moreover, if
existing groundwater users are guaranteed an initial permit, there
would likewise be little reason to fear constitutional difficulties.
In jurisdictions in which the right to take groundwater was already
qualified by the reasonable use doctrine, or the Restatement doctrine of the same name, the reduction in right is even less significant.
D.

Interstate Sharing

There remain vital issues, unrelated to the working of the
permit system itself, particularly those surrounding the sharing of
interstate water sources, that are beyond the competence of a single
state enacting its own water management laws. States that are
engaged in serious intrastate planning for water allocation need to
know just how much of the shared water resource is "theirs" to
use, and what must be left for others. Here both Eastern and
Western experience with allocating water among states through
litigation or interstate compact has been unsatisfactory.8 2 There
79. For a less optimistic view of Eastern groundwater permit systems as they
have operated in the past, see Tarlock, Supplemental GroundwaterIrrigationLaw:
From Capture to Sharing, 73 Ky. L. REv. 695, 719-21 (1985) (role of common
exemptions, such as domestic and irrigation use, in failure of groundwater permit
systems).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
81. See Tarlock, supra note 79, at 721.
82. See generally J. SAx & R. ABRAMs, supra note 9, at 698-750; Carver,
Interstate Water Compacts (unpublished paper presented at Conference on New
Sources of Water for Energy Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers, held
at the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law
(June 1982)) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
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are alternatives, such as multistate political entities that could
manage water on a hydrologic basis, rather than on a geopolitical

basis,

3

congressional intervention, which past history indicates is
s4
or a federal planning effort that first
studies water
85
supply and demand and then allocates the water.
unlikely

In the end, though, the question of interstate competition for

scarce water resources will not alter significantly the general dimensions of the permit system traced above. The systems adopted
in the riparian East will operate as best they can, with or without

the increased certainty about the level of available supply that
interstate allocation could provide. It is no doubt unrealistic to
think that changed water supply conditions in the East will alter
the longstanding obduracy of the states and the federal government

to commit themselves to a process that relieves the uncertainty
regarding entitlements to use interstate waters. States that move

more rapidly to establish and implement comprehensive allocation
systems may find that they gain an advantage in interstate water

allocation litigation. The most recent major interstate water apportionment decision of the United States Supreme Court stressed

protection for existing users of a fully appropriated stream in
preference to a new claim by the competing state, which "has not
committed itself to any longterm
use for which the future benefits
86
can be studied and predicted. '

83. The closest thing to this is found in some of the interstate compacts in
which the basin commissions have substantial regulatory authority to control water
users within their jurisdiction. The best example is the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC). See J. SAX & R. ABRAms, supra note 9, at 747-50; Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-Equal Protection-DelawareRiver Basin Commission Resolution Exempting Existing Uses from Water Charges Fails to Satisfy Rational
Relation Test, 27 VIL. L. REv. 616 (1981-82); see also Delaware River Basin
Comm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981)
(reviewing management powers of DRBC).
84. Congress has apportioned only one interstate watercourse, the Colorado
River. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
85. Federal efforts in this area display a long history of study unrelated to
subsequent action. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER
THE FuTuRE, FINAL REPORT TO

COMMISSION,

WATER PoucIEs FOR

THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION

OF THE

UNITED

(1973).

86. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 321 (1984). Likewise, the Court
has intimated that anti-export rules stand a chance of surviving dormant commerce
clause scrutiny, if the regulation aided a demonstrated need "to conserve and
preserve" water to meet intrastate shortages. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 955 (1982).
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CONCLUSION

This final Article in a trilogy tracing the course of Eastern
water law describes what kind of legal management system can
manage the allocation of water in times of shortage. Here, the
instrumentalist theory forms the basis for a reverse engineering
project, identifying those water uses that are quintessentially important, and working back to legal mechanisms that promote them.
Society demamds that the water needed to fill the most critical
uses-drinking, sewage, and ecosystem maintenance-be exempt
from curtailment. To protect the security of use for the most
important classes of use, the legal system can grant an enforceable
preference to receive the water ahead of less vital uses. To protect
the economies that surround those penultimate and other waterdependent activities, the system must provide as much additional
security of right as possible. An entire hierarchical system emerges
as each class of use is identified in order of importance.
The scheme sketched here is assuredly not the only one that
can succeed where riparianism will fail. It is a pragmatic system,
one that is intended to do most directly what water law has always
done-ensure that the water resource serves the most important
human and societal needs. That is the thrust of the instrumentalist
theory, and must be the centerpiece of riparianism's successor
system. Whatever emerges will no more resemble riparianism than
does the East's history of superabundant water supplies resemble
its future of increasing water shortages. The details of how that
system operates are of less concern than ensuring that the nature
of contemporary Eastern water law dialogue is altered from musings about whether riparianism will again survive, and whether
change is in order, to taking concrete steps to build a new legal
system of water allocation. The evidence of subregional shortages
is already common, the forecasts for the future offer no relief.
The time has come for replacing riparianism.

